Traveling on the Indonesian island of Bali, I saw a brick-making facility and stopped to visit. Boys and women were building bricks by hand, in the hot sun. I watched young boys scoop wet mud from a quarry by a creek into their wheelbarrows. They poured the mud into wooden forms. Once the bricks began to dry and harden in the sun, someone had to turn the bricks repeatedly to prevent them from cracking.

The woman in Figure 5.1 worked ten hours a day, six days a week, turning, stacking, and restacking bricks to prevent them from cracking. For her work, she earned about 45 cents (U.S.) per hour.

More than a century ago, bricks were made this way in the United States. Today, the brick-making industry in the United States makes use of a great deal of technology and robotics to manufacture bricks. Instead of using the sun to bake the bricks, brick-making factories in the United States employ enormous tunnel-shaped kilns. The *Mississippi Business Journal* described how bricks are made in one factory: “Clay and water go in one end of the new 590 foot tunnel kiln and brick pallets will roll out the other end as robots and employees work side by side.”

What hit me harder than the difference in technology between the two countries is the difference in labor. In Bali, women and boys make bricks. In the United States, the vast majority of brick-makers are men, aided by machines. One company estimated that 98 percent of its operations’ employees in the factory are men. What
makes brick-making a job for women and boys in Bali and a job for men and robots in the United States? Does being a brick-maker mean different things in each of these places?

Throughout the world, different cultures and societies have different ideas about what jobs are appropriate for men and what jobs are appropriate for women. Geographers, especially those who study gender, realize people have created divisions of labor that are gendered. Geographers Mona Domosh and Joni Seager define gender as “a culture’s assumptions about the differences between men and women: their ‘characters,’ the roles they play in society, what they represent.” Divisions of labor are one of the clearest ways in which societies are gendered.

In Bali, brick-making is still done by hand by boys and women. The industry is not technologically sophisticated, and bricks are made one by one. Even beyond brick-making facilities, most of the factory jobs in Indonesia and in poorer countries of the world go to women instead of men. Factory managers in these areas often hire women over men because they see women as an expendable labor pool. Researcher Peter Hancock studied gender relations and women’s work in factories in Indonesia and reported, “Research in different global contexts suggests that factory managers employ young women because they are more easily exploited, less likely to strike or form membership organizations, are comparatively free from family responsibilities, and more adept at doing repetitive and delicate tasks associated with assembly line work.”

In many societies in poorer countries, families see young women as financial supporters of their families. Thus, many women migrate from rural areas and travel to cities or central industrial locales (such as export production zones—EPZs) to produce and earn a wage that is then sent home to support the schooling of their brothers and younger sisters (until these girls are also old enough to leave home and work). In Indonesia and in neighboring Malaysia and the Philippines, many women temporarily migrate to the Middle East to work as domestics: cooking, cleaning, and providing childcare in order to send money home to support the family. In the United States, rarely does an oldest daughter migrate to the city to labor in a factory so she can pay for her younger brothers’ schooling.

Although public education in the United States is free and open to boys and girls, American society still has gendered divisions of labor. The few women who work in brick-manufacturing facilities in the United States are typically assigned to tasks that require little lifting—such as gluing pieces of the various types of brick the company produces to boards so that salespeople can use them as samples. A long-standing assumption in American society is that work requiring heavy lifting needs to be completed by men and that good-paying, unionized jobs need to go to men because men are the “heads of the household.” Times are changing and gendered work is being increasingly challenged, but assumptions about gender still have an impact on the labor market.

Society creates boxes in which we put people and expect them to live. These boxes are in a sense stereotypes embodying assumptions we make about what is expected from or assumed about women, men, members of certain races or ethnic groups, and people with various sexual preferences. By creating these boxes, society can assign entire professions or tasks to members of certain categories, for example “women’s work,” thereby gendering the division of labor. Places, notably the kitchen of a home or a store in the mall, can also be gendered. People are constantly negotiating their personal identities, finding their ways through all the expectations placed on them by the boxes society puts around them, and
modifying and reinforcing the social relations that create the places where they work and live.

Rarely do the social relations that create gendered divisions of labor focus only on gender. The social relations in a place also create boxes for other identities. In this chapter, we focus on gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality. We examine how people and society construct identities, how place factors into identity, and how geography reflects and shapes power relationships among different groups of people.

Key Questions For Chapter 5

1. What is identity, and how are identities constructed?
2. How do places affect identity, and how can we see identities in places?
3. How does geography reflect and shape power relationships among groups?

WHAT IS IDENTITY, AND HOW ARE IDENTITIES CONSTRUCTED?

A man gets off the airplane, walks to the baggage carousel to find his suitcase, and is greeted by dozens of black suitcases. He walks to the parking garage to find his car and sees a sea of black cars that all look the same. The narrator intones, “Maintain your identity. Drive a Saab.”

Identities are marketed through cars, clothing, club memberships, jewelry, and houses. Advertisements often convey the impression that we can purchase our identity. Yet, identity is much more personal than what we drive, wear, belong to, or where we live. Geographer Gillian Rose defines identity as “how we make sense of ourselves.” How do each of us define ourselves? We construct our own identities through experiences, emotions, connections, and rejections. We work through derivations and delineations to find an identity that meshes with who and where we are at any given time. An identity is a snapshot, an image of who we are at that moment. Identities are fluid, constantly changing, shifting, and becoming. Place and space are integral to our identities because our experiences in places and our perceptions of places help us make sense of who we are.

In addition to defining ourselves, we define others and others define us. One of the most powerful ways to construct an identity is by identifying against other people. To identify against, we first define the “Other,” and then we define ourselves in opposing terms. Edward Said wrote thoughtfully about how Europeans, over time, constructed an image of regions that are now commonly called the Middle East and Asia. He described the circumstances that led Europeans to define this area as the “Orient,” a place with supposedly mystical characteristics that were depicted and repeated in European art and literature. In a similar vein, geographer James Blaut wrote eloquently about how Europeans came to define Africans and Americans as “savage” and “mystical.”

Through these images of the “Other,” which developed during periods of European exploration and colonialism, Europeans defined themselves as “not mystical” or “not savage” and, therefore, as “civilized.” These ideas are still part of our vernacular speech even today, as seen in references to “the civilized world” or a time “before civilization.” Phrases such as these invariably carry with them a sense of superiority in opposition to an “Other.”

One of the most powerful foci of identity in the modern world is the state. State nationalism has been such a powerful force that in many contexts people think of themselves first and foremost as French, Japanese, or American. Nationalist identities are a product of the modern state system, so we defer consideration of this form of identity to the chapter focused on the rise of the state system (Chapter 8). But nationalist identities coexist with all sorts of other identities that divide humanity—identities that can trump state nationalism in certain contexts and certain scales of interaction. Language and religion can function as foci of identity, and we will turn to these in the next two chapters.

This chapter takes up several other important foundations of identity—those based on race, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality. We look at issues of identity construction, place, and scale by way of an analysis of race. We examine ethnicity and sexuality as identities that are shaped by and that shape place. Our concluding discussion in this chapter looks at power relationships through the lenses of gender and ethnicity.

Race

Race provides an excellent example of the ways in which geographic context shapes axes of identity. The various “races” to which people refer are the product of ways of viewing minor genetic differences that developed as modern humans spread around the world. The physical attributes that are seen as significant have changed across time and space. In
What Is Identity, and How Are Identities Constructed?

Precolonial Africa, lines of division sometimes reflected differences in skin tones among people whom Europeans all came to view as “black” during the colonial period. Yet modern ways of dividing people into races have become so pervasive that we find ourselves continually filling out census forms, product warranty information, surveys, medical forms, and application forms that ask us to “check” a box identifying ourselves by races, for example “white,” “black,” “Asian” (Fig. 5.2). Such practices tend to naturalize and reinforce modern ways of viewing race.

Where did society get the idea that humans fall into different, seemingly unchangeable categories of race? Throughout history, societies in different parts of the world have drawn distinctions among peoples based on their physical characteristics, but many of societies’ modern assumptions about race grew out of the period of European exploration and colonialism. Yet as Benedict Anderson notes, even before the Age of Exploration and colonialism, wealthy Europeans defined themselves as superior to those living elsewhere, suggesting that socioeconomic differences can fuel the sense of superiority attached to race known as racism. With the onset of the colonial era, however, even the nonwealthy in colonizing countries came to define themselves as superior to the people in the colonies. Anderson explains:

Colonial racism was a major element in that conception of “Empire” which attempted to weld dynastic legitimacy and national community. It did so by generalizing a principle of innate, inherited superiority on which its own domestic position was (however shakily) based to the vastness of the overseas possessions, covertly (or not so covertly) conveying the idea that if, say, English lords were naturally superior to other Englishmen, no matter: these other Englishmen were no less superior to the subjected natives.

The stories the commoners heard about the “mystical” and “savage” “Others” fostered feelings of superiority. One of the easiest ways to define the “Other” is through skin color because it is visible. Differences in the color of skin, then, became the basis for a fundamental social divide.

What society typically calls a “race” is in fact a combination of physical attributes in a population. Differences in skin color, eye color, and hair color likely result from a long history of adaptation to different environments. Sunlight stimulates the production of melanin, which protects skin from damaging ultraviolet rays; the more melanin that is present, the darker the skin will be. Many believe that this helps to explain why, over the millennia, humans living in low latitudes (closer to the equator, from tropical Africa through southern India to Australia) had darker skins. Another, not incompatible, theory holds that the production of vitamin D, which is a vitamin necessary to live a healthy life, is stimulated by the penetration of ultraviolet rays. Over the millennia, natural selection in higher latitudes, closer to the North and South Poles, favored those with the least amount of pigmentation. People with less pigmentation could more easily absorb ultraviolet rays, which, in the higher latitudes, are sparse in winter months with the amount of sunlight is lower and less direct. When humans absorb ultraviolet light, their bodies in turn produce vitamin D, which is a necessary nutrient for survival.

Whatever may be said about the link between environment and the development of particular physical characteristics, it is important to recognize that skin color is not a reliable indicator of genetic closeness. The indigenous peoples of southern India, New Guinea, and Australia, for example, are about as dark-skinned as native Africans, southern Indians, and Aboriginal Australians are not closely related genetically (Fig. 5.3). Thus there is no biological basis for dividing the human species into four or five groups based on skin color. Instead, those racial categories are the product of how particular cultures have dominantly viewed skin color.

The racial distinctions used in a place today are drawn from categories of skin color that are rooted in the cultural history, power relationships, and politics of a place over the past few centuries. Geographer Benjamin Forest gives us a global overview of racial distinctions:

In Britain, the term “black” refers not only to Afro-Caribbeans and Africans, but also to individuals from the Indian subcontinent. In Russia, the term “black” is used to describe “Caucasians,” that is, people such as Chechens from the Caucasus region. In many parts of Latin America, particularly Brazil, “racial” classification is really a kind
Chapter 5  
Identity: Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Sexuality

of class placement, in which members of the wealthy upper class are generally considered as “white,” members of the middle class as mixed race or Mestizo, and members of the lower class as “black.” Indeed, because racial classifications are based on class standing and physical appearance rather than ancestry, “the designation of one’s racial identity need not be the same as that of the parents, and siblings are often classified differently than one another.”

In each of these cases, and in countless others, people have constructed racial categories to justify power, economic exploitation, and cultural oppression.

Race and Ethnicity in the United States

Unlike a local culture or ethnicity to which we may choose to belong, race is an identity that is more often assigned. In the words, once again, of Benjamin Forest: “In many respects, racial identity is not a self-consciously constructed collection of characteristics, but a condition which is imposed by a set of external social and historical constraints.” In the United States, racial categories are reinforced through residential segregation, racialized divisions of labor, and the categories of races recorded by the United States Census Bureau and other government and nongovernmental agencies.

Definitions of races in the United States historically focused on dividing the country into “white” and “nonwhite,” but how these categories are understood has changed over time (Figure 5.4). For example, when immigration to the United States shifted from northern and western Europe to southern and eastern Europe in the early twentieth century, the United States government
What Is Identity, and How Are Identities Constructed?

and the public at large had to redefine what constituted “white” so that people with olive-colored skin from the Mediterranean would count as “white.”

As a result of immigration and differences in fertility rates, the United States is becoming increasingly “non-white.” At the same time, how Americans define “race” is changing. Before 2000, the United States Census classified “Hispanic” as a race. This categorization was chosen because people in Latin America, like North America, represent different races. Before the 2000 census a white person from Venezuela, a black person from Brazil, and a native person from Bolivia were all classified as “Hispanic.” This example demonstrates the arbitrary nature of racial and ethnic classifications. In this example, coming from Latin America “trumped” all other identities and the person was defined as “Hispanic.” Hispanic, then, is not a race. It is better defined as an ethnicity. However, the word “Hispanic” means coming from a country where Spanish is the predominant language, including Spain, Mexico, and many countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean. In our example above, the black person from Brazil who was classified as “Hispanic” should not have been under this definition. The predominant language in Brazil is Portuguese, not Spanish.

In 2000, the United States Census categorized “Hispanic” as an ethnicity rather than a race. In the boxes provided by the United States Census Bureau, a person can now be “White, non-Hispanic,” “White, Hispanic,” “Black, non-Hispanic,” “Black, Hispanic,” and so forth (Table 5.1).

In 2010, the United States Census recognized that “Hispanic” excludes people from Latin America who are not native Spanish speakers. The Census also recognized that some people, including United States Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, prefer the term “Latina” or “Latino” to “Hispanic.” In 2010, the United States Census Bureau described the Hispanic ethnicity as “Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin,” and continued to list Hispanic as an ethnicity and not a race.

**TABLE 5.1**

Population of the United States by Race, 2010. In 2000 and in 2010, the United States Census Bureau allowed Americans to categorize themselves as one race or more than one race.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Percent of total population, 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>72.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian &amp; Pacific Islander</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Race</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or More Races</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from: United States Census Bureau, 2010.
With the evolution in understanding of race and ethnicity, it is sometimes difficult to choose the right term to describe an individual or group of people. In this chapter and in the rest of the textbook, we use the most precise description as possible. Instead of a generic term “Hispanic,” if we are talking about a group of immigrants from Bolivia, we call the people immigrants from Bolivia. If we discuss a study about Cree Indians in Canada, we describe the Cree tribe, not a generic term First Nations. In general references, we use the term “Hispanic” instead of “Latino” or “Latina” in accordance with a 2008 Pew Research survey. The survey of Americans who defined themselves as “Hispanic” or “Latino,” found “36% of respondents prefer the term ‘Hispanic,’ 21% prefer the term ‘Latino’ and the rest have no preference.”

In the United States, 64 percent of the Hispanic population is of Mexican origin, and 9 percent of people who define themselves as Hispanic are of Puerto Rican descent. In the 2000 and 2010 censuses, all persons who defined themselves as Hispanic also defined themselves by a racial category. By combining race and ethnicity boxes, statisticians can still separate the American population into “White, non-Hispanic” and “everyone else.” According to the data projections provided after the 2010 Census, the population of “everyone else” will surpass (in numbers) the “White, non-Hispanic” population around in 2042 (Table 5.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of projection</th>
<th>Estimated percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2050</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5.2**

Estimated Percentage of United States Population by Race and Ethnicity until 2050.

In 2000, the United States Census Bureau began to calculate race and Hispanic origin separately, allowing people to place themselves in one or more race categories plus one of two Hispanic origin categories (Hispanic or Non-Hispanic). According to the race categories provided in the 2010 census estimates, starting in 2042, the “White, non-Hispanic” population will no longer be the majority population in the United States.

*Data from: United States Census, 2008.*
Residential Segregation

Racism has affected the distribution of African Americans, American Indians, and others throughout the history of the United States. During the past century, some of the most dramatic geographic impacts of racism could be found at the neighborhood scale. Historically, states, cities, and towns passed laws that promoted residential segregation by disallowing the migration of certain racial groups into particular neighborhoods. Laws passed during and after the civil rights movement of the 1960s in the United States made it illegal to legislate residential segregation. Despite these changes, many cities in the United States remain strongly segregated along racial lines.

Geographers Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton defined residential segregation as the “degree to which two or more groups live separately from one another, in different parts of the urban environment.” Massey and Denton defined different kinds of residential segregation in a 1988 article, explaining that residential segregation is complex because:

- groups may live apart from one another and be “segregated” in a variety of ways. Minority members may be distributed so that they are overrepresented in some areas and underrepresented in others, varying on the characteristic of evenness. They may be distributed so that their exposure to majority members is limited by virtue of rarely sharing a neighborhood with them. They may be spatially concentrated within a very small area, occupying less physical space than majority members. They may be spatially centralized, congregating around the urban core, and occupying a more central location than the majority. Finally, areas of minority settlement may be tightly clustered to form one large contiguous enclave, or be scattered widely around the urban area.

A special report issued by the United States Census Bureau in 2002 statistically analyzed, charted, and mapped residential segregation in metropolitan areas of the country, using the following five statistical measurements of segregation: evenness, exposure, concentrated, centralized, and clustered. These five measurements directly correspond to the five types of segregation outlined by Massey and Denton.

In the 2002 Census Bureau report, the authors reported on the levels of residential segregation in metropolitan areas of the United States between 1980 and 2000. They found that overall residential segregation by race/ethnicity is on the decline. For each of the four identities they researched—American Indians and Alaska Natives; Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders; Black/African Americans; and Hispanics/Latinos—they calculated five statistical measures of residential segregation.¹

The researchers reported that all five measures showed a decrease in residential segregation for African Americans between 1980 and 1990 and another such decrease between 1990 and 2000. A report after the 2010 census found that residential segregation for African Americans peaked in the 1960s and 1970s and declined again between 2000 and 2010. Between 2000 and 2010, residential segregation did increase in fewer than 10 of 102 metropolitan areas with populations of 500,000 or more. In 2010, the most residentially segregated large metropolitan area for African Americans was Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Fig. 5.5).

In 2000, when using an average of all five measures of segregation, the most residentially segregated metropolitan area for American Indians and Alaska Natives was Phoenix-Mesa, Arizona, and the least residentially segregated is Oklahoma City. In 2000, the four least residentially segregated metropolitan areas (with at least 3 percent of the population American Indian) were all in Oklahoma.

Grouping Asians, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders, researchers of the 2000 report found 30
Chapter 5   Identity: Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Sexuality

accounting for at least 3 percent of the total urban population. The city with the greatest residential segregation for Hispanics was New York, and Baltimore was one of the least segregated.

The numbers and maps produced by the Census Bureau based on 2000 data and from Brookings Institute demographer William Frey based on the 2010 data show the outcomes of a variety of stories, but they do not tell us the stories. Why does residential segregation persist in some places and not in others? In some of the most segregated cities, people know where the “other” lives and will purposefully choose to live in neighborhoods with people like themselves instead. Real estate agents and community leaders may consciously or subconsciously direct people to their “own” neighborhoods (blockbusting and redlining are discussed in Chapter 9). In some cities, race is related to class, making it difficult to afford a higher class neighborhood that is also populated by another race. In other cities, people may choose to live in a blighted neighborhood because it is their neighborhood, one they have helped create and that reflects their culture.

Figure 5.6
Residential Segregation of Hispanics/Latinos and Asians/Pacific Islanders in Baltimore, Maryland. Percent of Hispanics/Latinos and Asian/Pacific Islanders by census tract.
Data from: United States Census Bureau, 2010.

metropolitan areas with at least 3 percent of the population fitting one of these identities. Based on calculations for all five statistics of residential segregation, the most residentially segregated metropolitan area for Asians/Pacific Islanders was San Francisco, followed by New York and Los Angeles. The data and maps change depending on how statistics are calculated. A report after the 2010 census examined Asian segregation using a dissimilarity index with white populations in 102 large metropolitan areas. The report based on the 2010 census data found Buffalo/Niagara Falls to be the most segregated for Asians (not including Pacific Islanders) based on the dissimilarity index and considering all large metropolitan areas, not only those with at least 3% of the population being Asian.

Baltimore, Maryland (Fig. 5.6) is one of the more residentially integrated cities in the United States for Asians and also for Hispanics/Latinos. The report based on the 2000 census found that the cities with the highest number of Hispanic residents experienced the greatest degree of residential segregation. They focused their analysis on the 36 large metropolitan areas with an Hispanic population accounting for at least 3 percent of the total urban population. The city with the greatest residential segregation for Hispanics was New York, and Baltimore was one of the least segregated.
What Is Identity, and How Are Identities Constructed?

New immigrants to a city often move to low-income areas that are being gradually abandoned by older immigrant groups. This process is called succession. In New York, Puerto Ricans moved into the immigrant Jewish neighborhood of East Harlem in the early twentieth century, successively assuming a dominant presence in the neighborhood. With the influx of Puerto Ricans, new names for the neighborhood developed, and today it is frequently called Spanish Harlem or El Barrio (meaning “neighborhood” in Spanish). As the Puerto Rican population grew, new storefronts appeared, catering to the Puerto Rican population, such as travel agencies (specializing in flights to Puerto Rico), specialty grocery stores, and dance and music studios.

Like the immigrant flow from Puerto Rico, the large-scale immigrant flow from the Dominican Republic that began in 1965 resulted in a distinct neighborhood and cultural landscape. Dominican immigrants landed in the Washington Heights/Inwood neighborhood of upper Manhattan, a neighborhood previously occupied by immigrant Jews, African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. Miyares reports that although a Jewish cultural landscape persists, including a Jewish university, synagogues, and Jewish delicatessens, the cultural landscape of Washington Heights is clearly Dominican—from store signs in Spanish to the presence of the colors of the Dominican flag (Fig. 5.7).

New York is unique because of the sheer number and diversity of its immigrant population. The city's cultural landscape reflects its unique population. As Miyares explains:

Since the overwhelming majority of New York City's population lives in apartments as opposed to houses, it is often difficult to discern the presence of an ethnic group by looking at residential housescapes. However every neighborhood has a principal commercial street, and this is often converted into an ethnic main street. It is commonly through business signs that immigrants make their presence known. Names of businesses reflect place names from the home country or key cultural artifacts. Colors of the national flag are common in store awnings, and the flags themselves and national crests abound in store decor. Key religious symbols are also common. Immigrants are so prevalent and diverse that coethnic proprietors use many kinds of visual clues to attract potential customers.

Throughout the process, new immigrants need not change the facades of apartment buildings to reflect their culture. Instead, many new immigrants focus their attention on the streetscapes, creating businesses to serve their community and reflect their culture.

The Caribbean presence in the city is so strong that some people think that new Hispanic migrants to New York City simply have to adapt to Caribbean cultural

Identities Across Scales

The way we make sense of ourselves in an increasingly globalized world is complex. We have different identities at different scales: individual, local, regional, national, and global. At the individual scale, we may see ourselves as a daughter, a brother, a golfer, or a student. At the local scale, we may see ourselves as members of a community, leaders of a campus organization, or residents of a neighborhood. At the regional scale, we may see ourselves as Southerners, as north Georgians, as Atlantans, as Yankees living in the South, or as migrants from another region of the world. At the national scale, we may see ourselves as American, as college students, or as members of a national political party. At the global scale, we may see ourselves as Western, as educated, as relatively wealthy, or as free.

One way to view an individual’s various identities is to treat them as nested, one inside of the other; the appropriate identity is revealed at the appropriate scale. In this vein, each larger territorial extent of geographic space has its own corresponding set of identities. Today, more geographers see identities as fluid, intertwined, and context dependent rather than as neatly nested. Identities affect each other in and across scales, and the ways places and peoples interact across scales simultaneously affect identities within and across scales.

The Scale of New York City

One way scale affects identity is by helping to shape what is seen—what identity is apparent to others and to ourselves at different scales. To demonstrate this idea, we can shift our focus from residential segregation in all large metropolitan areas in North America to one enormous metropolitan area, New York City. New York has a greater number and diversity of immigrants than any other city in the United States. At the scale of New York, we can see how identities change so that we are no longer simply Hispanic (as the Census enumerates us); we are Puerto Rican or Mexican or Dominican from a certain neighborhood.

The point is that the people in New York are much more diverse than the box on census forms labeled “Hispanic” would suggest. In a chapter called “Changing Latinization of New York City,” geographer Inés Miyares highlights the importance of Caribbean culture to New York. The majority of New York’s 2.2 million “Hispanics” are Puerto Ricans and Dominicans (together accounting for over 65 percent of Hispanics in the city). As the majority Hispanic culture, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans have had a profound impact on New York’s cultural landscape.
norms. Miyares cautions, however, that not all Hispanics in the city are categorically assimilated into the Caribbean culture. Rather, the local identities of the Hispanic populations in New York vary by “borough, by neighborhood, by era, and by source country and entry experience.” Since 1990, the greatest growth in the Hispanic population of New York has been Mexican. Mexican migrants have settled in a variety of ethnic neighborhoods, living alongside new Chinese immigrants in Brooklyn and Puerto Ricans in East Harlem. The process of succession continues in New York, with Mexican immigrants moving into and succeeding other Hispanic neighborhoods, sometimes producing tensions between and among the local cultures.

In New York and in specific neighborhoods such as East Harlem, the word Hispanic does little to explain the diversity of the city. At these scales, different identities are claimed and assigned, identities that reflect local cultures and neighborhoods. The overarching category “Hispanic” tells us even less about diversity when one moves up to the scale of the United States, but as long as that category persists in the Census, people will be encouraged to think about it as a meaningful basis for understanding social differences.

Recall the last time you were asked to check a box for your race. Does that box factor into how you make sense of yourself individually, locally, regionally, nationally, and globally? What impact might it have on how other people view you?
How Do Places Affect Identity, and How Can We See Identities in Places?

The processes of constructing identities and identifying against an “Other,” just like any other social or cultural process, differ from place to place and are rooted in places. When we construct identities, part of what we do is to infuse place with meaning by attaching memories and experiences to the place. This process of infusing a place “with meaning and feeling” is what Gillian Rose and countless other geographers refer to as “developing a sense of place.” Like identity, our sense of place is fluid; it changes as the place changes and as we change.

What is of particular interest to geographers is how people define themselves through places. Our sense of place becomes part of our identity, and our identity affects the ways we define and experience place. Rose explains:

One way in which identity is connected to a particular place is by a feeling that you belong to that place. It’s a place in which you feel comfortable, or at home, because part of how you define yourself is symbolized by certain qualities of that place. The geographer Relph, for example, has even gone so far as to claim that “to be human is to live in a world that is filled with significant places: to be human is to have to know your place.”

The uniqueness of a place can become a part of who we are.

Ethnicity and Place

Ethnicity offers a good example of how identities affect places and how places affect identities. The idea of ethnicity as an identity stems from the notion that people are closely bounded, even related, in a certain place over time. The word *ethnic* comes from the ancient Greek word *ethnos*, meaning “people” or “nation.” Geographer Stuart Hall explains, “Where people share not only a culture but an *ethnos*, their belongingness or binding into group and place, and their sense of cultural identity, are very strongly defined.” Hall makes clear that ethnic identity is “historically constructed like all cultural identities” and is often considered natural because it implies ancient relations among a people over time.

This definition may sound simple, but the concept of ethnicity is not. In the United States, for example, a group of people may define their ethnicity as Swiss American. Switzerland is a state in Europe. The people in Switzerland speak four major languages and other minor ones. The strongest identities in Switzerland are most often at the canton level—a small geographically defined area that distinguishes cultural groups within the state. So, which Swiss are Swiss Americans? The way Swiss Americans see Switzerland as part of who they are may not exist in Switzerland proper (Fig. 5.8). Ethnicity sways and shifts across scales, across places, and across time. A map showing all recognizable ethnic areas would look like a three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle with thousands of often-overlapping pieces—some no larger than a neighborhood, others as large as entire countries.

Ethnic identity is greatly affected by scale and place. In 2002, the Washington Post reported about the thriving South Asian community in Fairfax County, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C. In South Asia, the countries of Pakistan and India have a history of animosity, and people identify themselves by country within the region of South Asia and by areas within each country. However, in Fairfax County, Virginia, a world apart from India and Pakistan, many South Asians identify with each other. A South Asian video rental store rents both Pakistani and Indian movies. South Asian grocery stores carry foods from both countries and areas within the countries. The geographical context of suburban Washington, D.C. fosters a collective South Asian identity.

Cultural groups often invoke ethnicity when race cannot explain differences and antagonism between groups. Just as “racial conflicts” are rooted in perceptions of distinctiveness based on differences in economics, power, language, religion, lifestyle, or historical experience, so too are “ethnic conflicts.” A conflict is often called ethnic when a racial distinction cannot easily be made. For example, using physical appearance and skin color, an observer cannot distinguish the ethnic groups in many of the conflicts...
around the world. The adversaries in post–World War II conflicts in Northern Ireland, Spain, the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Ivory Coast, or Rwanda cannot be identified racially; thus “ethnicity” becomes the marker of difference.

In some instances, the term *ethnicity* is reserved for a small, cohesive, culturally linked group of people who stand apart from the surrounding culture (often as a result of migration). Like other aspects of culture, ethnicity is a dynamic phenomenon that must be understood in terms of the geographic context and scales in which it is situated.

**Chinatown in Mexicali**

The border region between the United States and Mexico is generally seen as a cultural meeting point between Mexicans and Anglo Americans. Yet the ethnic composition of people in the border region is more varied than Mexican and Anglo. Through migration, people from Germany, Russia, India, China, Japan, and countless other places also live in the cities and rural areas of the United States–Mexico border region. Over time some of the migrants to this region have blended into the larger community, and others have created distinct patterns of settlement and ethnically imprinted cultural landscapes.

The town of Mexicali is the capital of the State of Baja California (located in Mexico, just south of the State of California in the United States). Not far from the central business district of Mexicali lies one of the largest Chinatowns in Mexico. A 1995 study of the Mexicali Chinatown by geographer James R. Curtis showed that it has been the crucible of Chinese ethnicity in the Mexicali Valley throughout much of the twentieth century. Chinese began arriving in 1902, and by 1919 more than 11,000 Chinese were either permanent or temporary residents of the valley. They established a thriving Chinatown in the heart of Mexicali that served as the uncontested center of Chinese life in the region for decades (Fig. 5.9).

The Chinese of Mexicali were prominent players in the social and economic life of the city during the twentieth century. They owned and operated restaurants, retail trade establishments, commercial land developments, currency exchanges, and more. By 1989 they owned nearly 500 commercial or service properties. In an effort to sustain their cultural traditions and add to the cultural...
life of the city, they established the China Association, which plays an active role in Mexicali’s social and civic life.

Mexicali’s Chinatown is experiencing a transformation, as Chinese residents have dispersed to the edges of the city and beyond (many because they can afford to move out of town now). Relatively few Chinese continue to live in the city’s Chinatown; some have even moved across the border to Calexico (a city of 27,000 on the California side of the border), while retaining business interests in Mexicali. Yet Mexicali’s Chinatown continues to play an important symbolic and functional role for individuals of Chinese ancestry in the area, who are still shaping the region’s social and economic geography. Even in regions where an ethnic population is small in number, if they have a group identity and consciousness they can have a lasting effect on the cultural landscape.

Identity and Space

Another way of thinking about place is to consider it as a cross section of space. Doreen Massey and Pat Jess define space as “social relations stretched out” and place as “particular articulations of those social relations as they have come together, over time, in that particular location.” Part of the social relations of a place are the embedded assumptions about ethnicity, gender, and sexuality, about what certain groups “should” and “should not” do socially, economically, politically, even domestically. Geographers who study identities, such as gender, ethnicity, race, and sexuality, realize that when people make places, they do so in the context of surrounding social relationships. We can, for example, create places that are gendered—places seen as being appropriate for women or for men. A building can be constructed with the goal of creating gendered spaces within it, or a building can become gendered by the way people make use of it.

Sexuality and Space

Sexuality is part of humanity. Just as gender roles are culturally constructed, so too do cultures decide sexual norms. In their installment on “Sexuality and Space” in Geography in America at the Dawn of the 21st Century, geographers Glen Elder, Lawrence Knopp, and Heidi Nast argue that most social science across disciplines is written in a heteronormative way. This means that the default subject in the minds of the academics who write studies is heterosexual, white, and male. These geographers and many others are working to find out how heteronormative ideas influence understandings of places and cultures, and how the practices of peoples who do not conform to these ideas influence the development of places.

Geographers’ initial forays into the study of sexuality focused largely on the same kinds of questions posed by those who first took up the study of race, gender, and ethnicity. Geographers ask where people with shared identity live and gather, what they do to create a space for themselves, and what kinds of problems they confront. For example, early studies examining gay neighborhoods in San Francisco and London focused on how gay men created spaces and what those spaces meant to gay identities. Specific studies have also focused on the role of gay pride parades in creating communities and the political struggle for access to other parades such as St. Patrick’s Day parades in some cities. Other studies examine the role gays and lesbians play in the gentrification of neighborhoods in city centers (a topic we explore in Chapter 9).

Today, geographers studying sexuality are focusing not only on the distributions and experiences of people in places but also on the theories behind the experiences, the theories that explain and inform our understanding of sexuality and space. Many of the geographers who study sexuality are employing queer theory in their studies. By calling the theory queer theory, Elder, Knopp, and Nast explain that social scientists (in geography and other disciplines) are appropriating a commonly used word with negative connotations and turning it in a way that “highlights the contextual nature” of opposition to the heteronormative and focuses on the political engagement of queers with the heteronormative. Geographers are also concentrating on extending fieldwork on sexuality and space beyond the Western world of North America and Europe to the rest of the world, exploring and explaining the local contexts of political engagement.

In 2000, the United States Census Bureau counted the number of same-sex households in the United States. In 2010, the Census added same-sex marriage to their counts. These data, by census tract—a small area in cities and a larger area in rural America—made it possible for Gary Gates and Jason Ost to publish The Gay and Lesbian Atlas. Their detailed maps of major cities in the United States show concentrations of same-sex households in certain neighborhoods of cities (Fig. 5.10), such as Adams-Morgan and DuPont Circle in Washington, D.C., and the West Village and Chelsea in Manhattan (Fig. 5.11). Taking the Census data by county, we can see a pattern of same-sex households in the United States, with concentrations in cities with well-established gay and lesbian neighborhoods. And we can also see the presence of same-sex households throughout the country, throughout states where same-sex unions are illegal.

In the 2010 census, the government tallied the number of households where a same-sex couple (with or without children) lived. Study the map of same-sex households in New York by census tract in Figure 5.10. How would the map change if sexuality were one of the “boxes” every person filled out on the census?
It’s July 26, 2011, and I happen to be in New York City the weekend just after the State of New York legalized same-sex marriages. I cut it close getting to the airport so I could catch the first part of the annual Gay Pride parade. The parade, which started on the edge of the Chelsea neighborhood at 36th Street, traveled down 5th Avenue toward where I took this photograph near Union Square and ended in the West Village. Always a boisterous, celebratory event, the parade has a special feel this year as celebrants cheer what many describe as one of the great civil rights victories of the current era.

**Figure 5.10**
**Same-Sex Households in New York, 2010.** The map shows the concentrations of same-sex households in New York, by census tract. *Data from: United States Census Bureau, 2010.*

**Figure 5.11**
**New York, New York.** © Alexander B. Murphy.
How Does Geography Reflect and Shape Power Relationships Among Groups of People?

Power relationships are assumptions and structures about who is in control and who has power over others. Power relationships affect identities directly, and the nature of those effects depends on the geographical context in which they are situated. Power relationships also affect cultural landscapes by determining what is seen and what is not. Massey and Jess contend power is central to the study of place: “the power to win the contest over how the place should be seen, what meaning to give it; the power, in other words, to construct the dominant imaginative geography, the identities of place and culture.”

Power relationships do much more than shape the cultural landscape. Power relationships can also subjugate entire groups of people, enabling society to enforce ideas about the ways people should behave or where people should be welcomed or turned away—thus altering the distribution of peoples. Policies created by governments can limit the access of certain groups. Jim Crow laws in the United States once separated “black” spaces from “white” spaces, right down to public drinking fountains. Even without government support, people create places where they limit the access of other peoples. For example, in Belfast, Northern Ireland, Catholics and Protestants defined certain neighborhoods as excluding the “other” through painting murals, hanging bunting, and painting curbs (Fig. 5.12). In major cities in the United States, local governments do not create or enforce laws defining certain spaces as belonging to members of a certain gang, but the people themselves create spaces, much like the people of Belfast do, through graffiti, murals, and building colors.

Just Who Counts?

The statistics governments collect and report reflect the power relationships involved in defining what is valued and what is not. Think back to the Constitution of the United States prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, when the government enumerated a black person as three-fifths of a white person. Until 1924, the U.S. government did not recognize the right of all American Indians to vote even though the Fifteenth Amendment recognized the right to vote regardless of race in 1870. The U.S. government separated American Indians into those who were “civilized” enough to be citizens and those who were not (“Indians not taxed”) until 1924, when it recognized the citizenship of all American Indians born in the United States. Not until 1920 did enough states ratify the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which recognized the right of all Americans to vote regardless of sex. Despite progress in counting people of all races, ethnicities, and sex, some charge that the United States Census Bureau continues to undercount minority populations (see Chapter 2).

Throughout the world, the work of women is often undervalued and uncounted. When the United States and other state governments began to count the value of goods and services produced within state borders, they did so with the assumption that the work of the household is reserved for women and that this work does not contribute to the productivity of the state’s economy. The most commonly used statistic on productivity, the gross national income (the monetary worth of what is produced within a country plus income received from
in nearly all cultures and places around the world. A 2004 report from the United Nations stated that two-thirds of the 880 million illiterate adults in the world are women and that women account for 70 percent of the world’s poorest citizens. The World’s Women 2010 reported regional variations in agriculture employment for women. In Africa, for example, the proportion of women employed in agriculture ranges from a low of 19 percent in countries in southern Africa to a high of 68 percent in countries in eastern, middle, and western Africa. In Northern Africa, 42 percent of women are employed in agriculture and 41 percent of women are employed in services. In Asia, employment of women in agriculture ranges from 11 percent in eastern Asia, where 76 percent of women are employed in the service sector, to South Asia with 55 percent of women working in agriculture and 28 percent in the service sector.

Despite these conditions, the number of women in the “official” labor force is rising while the proportion of men in the labor force globally declined between 1990 and 2010. In The World’s Women 2010: Trends and Statistics, the United Nations reported “women are predominantly and increasingly employed in the services sector” of the formal economy. Combining paid work with work in the informal economy and unpaid domestic work, “women work longer hours than men do.” The proportion of women in the labor force grew in all regions reported by the United Nations except Asia and eastern Europe. In South America, for example, the percent of women in the labor force rose from 38 in 1990 to 59 in 2010. In North Africa, the participation of women in the labor force increased from 23 percent in 1990 to 29 percent in 2010 while over the same time period in Subsaharan Africa, women accounted for 60 and 62 percent of the labor force.

Even though women are in the official labor force in greater proportions than ever before, they continue to be paid less and have less access to food and education than men in nearly all cultures and places around the world. A 2004 report from the United Nations stated that two-thirds of the 880 million illiterate adults in the world are women and that women account for 70 percent of the world’s poorest citizens.

The World’s Women 2010 reported regional variations in agriculture employment for women. In Africa, for example, the proportion of women employed in agriculture ranges from a low of 19 percent in countries in southern Africa to a high of 68 percent in countries in eastern, middle, and western Africa. In Northern Africa, 42 percent of women are employed in agriculture and 41 percent of women are employed in services. In Asia, employment of women in agriculture ranges from 11 percent in eastern Asia, where 76 percent of women are employed in the service sector, to South Asia with 55 percent of women working in agriculture and 28 percent in the service sector.

Although the number of women working in industries globally is small relative to the proportion of men, it is rising. Employment of women in the industrial sector was slowed by the global economic downturn of the 2000s, as well as by mechanization, which leads to job reductions and hence to layoffs of women workers. In the maquiladoras of northern Mexico (see Chapter 10), for example, many women workers lost their jobs when labor markets contracted between 2001 and 2002, and then again between 2008 and 2010.

As the foregoing discussion has highlighted, many women engage in “informal” economic activity—that is, private, often home-based activity such as tailoring, beer brewing, food preparation, and soap making. Women who seek to move beyond subsistence activities but cannot enter the formal economic sector often turn to such work. In the migrant slums on the fringes of many cities, informal economic activity is the mainstay of communities.
influenced by geographically specific social and environmental circumstances.
Fieldwork is often the best way to understand how power structures in society create vulnerable groups at the local scale, and how those vulnerable groups might be affected by particular developments. Through fieldwork and interviews, geographers can see differences in vulnerability within groups of people.

Geographer Sarah Halvorson, for example, studied differences in the vulnerabilities of children in northern Pakistan. She examined the vulnerability of children to diarrheal diseases by paying attention to “constructions of gender, household politics, and gendered relationships that perpetuate inherent inequalities and differences between men and women and within and between social groups.” Halvorson studied 30 families, 15 of whom had a low frequency of diarrhea and dysentery and 15 of whom had a high frequency of these diseases. Through her fieldwork, Halvorson came to understand that several tangible resources, including income and housing, and several intangible resources, such as social status and position within the family structure, all influenced the vulnerability of children to diarrheal diseases in northern Pakistan. Halvorson found that people with higher incomes generally had lower disease rates, but that income was not the only relevant factor (Fig. 5.14). The least vulnerable children and women were those who had higher incomes and an established social network of support. In cases where income was low, if a woman had a strong social network, her children were more likely to be in the low-disease group.

Statistics showing how much women produce and how little their work is valued are undoubtedly interesting. Yet, the work geographers who study gender have done goes far beyond the accumulation of such data. Since the 1980s, geographers have asked why society talks about women and their roles in certain ways and how these ideas, heard and represented throughout our lives, affect geographic circumstances and how we understand them. For example, Ann Oberhauser and her co-authors explained that people in the West tend to think that women are employed in the textile and jewelry-making fields in poorer countries because the women in these regions are “more docile, submissive, and tradition bound” than women in more prosperous parts of the world. A geographer studying gender asks where these ideas about women come from and how they influence women’s work possibilities and social positions in different places—key elements in making places what they are.

Vulnerable Populations

Power relations can have a fundamental impact on which populations or areas are particularly vulnerable to disease, death, injury, or famine. Geographers use mapping and spatial analysis to predict and explain what populations or people will be affected most by natural hazards such as earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, and tsunamis or by environmental policies. The study of vulnerability requires thinking geographically because not all people and places are affected in the same way by social, political, economic, or environmental change. Rather, vulnerability is fundamentally influenced by geographically specific social and environmental circumstances.

Fieldwork is often the best way to understand how power structures in society create vulnerable groups at the local scale, and how those vulnerable groups might be affected by particular developments. Through fieldwork and interviews, geographers can see differences in vulnerability within groups of people. Geographer Sarah Halvorson, for example, studied differences in the vulnerabilities of children in northern Pakistan. She examined the vulnerability of children to diarrheal diseases by paying attention to “constructions of gender, household politics, and gendered relationships that perpetuate inherent inequalities and differences between men and women and within and between social groups.”

Halvorson studied 30 families, 15 of whom had a low frequency of diarrhea and dysentery and 15 of whom had a high frequency of these diseases. Through her fieldwork, Halvorson came to understand that several tangible resources, including income and housing, and several intangible resources, such as social status and position within the family structure, all influenced the vulnerability of children to diarrheal diseases in northern Pakistan. Halvorson found that people with higher incomes generally had lower disease rates, but that income was not the only relevant factor (Fig. 5.14). The least vulnerable children and women were those who had higher incomes and an established social network of support. In cases where income was low, if a woman had a strong social network, her children were more likely to be in the low-disease group.

Geographer Joseph Oppong recognized that the spatial analysis of a disease can reveal what populations are most vulnerable in a country. In North America and Europe,
HIV/AIDS is much more prevalent among homosexual and bisexual men than among heterosexual men and women. In Subsaharan Africa, women have much higher rates of HIV/AIDS than men. As Oppong explains, “AIDS as a global problem has unique local expressions that reflect the spatial distribution and social networks of vulnerable social groups.”

According to Oppong, in most of Subsaharan Africa, HIV/AIDS rates are highest for women in urban areas and for women who work as sex workers. However, in Ghana, HIV/AIDS rates were lower for women in the urban area of Accra. Oppong postulates that women in Accra have lower HIV/AIDS rates because they have greater access to health care than women in rural areas. Women in rural areas who were not treated for malaria had higher incidences of HIV/AIDS, according to his research. Oppong also found that women in polygamous relationships in the Muslim part of northern Ghana had lower HIV/AIDS rates. Oppong offers two theories to explain why women Muslims in polygamous relationships had lower HIV/AIDS rates: first, as a matter of cultural practice, most Muslims tend to avoid sexual promiscuity, and second, Muslims in Ghana practice circumcision, which helps lower the rate of HIV/AIDS transmission in that part of the country.

Fieldwork helps geographers apply vulnerability theory to understand how existing spatial structures, power relationships, and social networks affect the susceptibility of people to diseases and other hazards around the world.
Women in Subsaharan Africa

Migration flows, birth rates, and child mortality rates affect the gender composition of cities, states, and regions. Some regions of the world have become male-dominated, whereas other regions have become female-dominated—at least numerically.

Much of Subsaharan Africa, especially rural areas, is dominated numerically by women. In this region of the world, most rural to urban migrants are men. Domosh and Seager point out that men leave rural areas to work in heavy industry and mines in the cities, “while women are left behind to tend the farms and manage the household economy. Indeed parts of rural South Africa and Zimbabwe have become feminized zones virtually depopulated of men.”

In the large region of Subsaharan Africa, women outnumber men in many rural areas. Women in Subsaharan Africa have heavy responsibilities, coupled in many places with few rights and little say (Fig. 5.15). Women produce an estimated 70 percent of the region’s food, almost all of it without the aid of modern technology. Their backbreaking hand-cultivation of corn and other staples is an endless task. As water supplies decrease, the exhausting walk to the nearest pump gets longer. Firewood is being cut at ever-greater distances from the village, and the task of hauling it home becomes more difficult every year. As men leave for the towns, sometimes to marry other wives and have other children, the women left in the villages often struggle for survival.

Even though a woman in this position becomes the head of a household, if she goes to a bank for a loan she may well be refused; traditional banks throughout much of Africa do not lend money to rural women. Not having heard from her husband for years and having reared her
Today, the country where women hold the highest proportion of legislative seats is neither Uganda nor South Africa. Rather, another African country, Rwanda, is the first country in the world where women hold more than 50 percent of the legislative seats. Women passed the 50 percent mark in the 2008 election in Rwanda (Figure 5.17). Rwanda suffered a bloody civil war in the 1990s and over 800,000 people died (one-tenth of the population at the time), a majority of whom were men. Immediately after the war, women accounted for more than 70 percent of the population of the country. Today, women account for 55 percent of the voting-age population. The Rwandan constitution, adopted in 2003, recognizes the equality of women and set a quota of at least 30 percent women in all government decision-making bodies. Of the 80 legislative seats in Rwanda, 24 are reserved for women. In these 24 seats, the only candidates are women and only women can vote.

Dowry Deaths in India

On a 2004 Oprah! show, the talk show hostess interviewed journalist Lisa Ling about her travels through India and her reports on dowry deaths in India. The Chicago audience looked stunned to discover that thousands of girls in India are still betrothed through arranged marriages and that in some extreme cases, disputes over the dowry, which is the price to be paid by the bride’s family to the groom’s father, have led to the death of the bride. The bride may be brutally punished, often burned, or killed for her father’s failure to fulfill a marriage agreement.
How Does Geography Reflect and Shape Power Relationships Among Groups of People?

Only a small fraction of India's girls are involved in dowry deaths, but the practice is not declining. According to the Indian government, in 1985, the number was 999; in 1987, 1786 women died at the hands of vengeful husbands or in-laws; in 1989, 2436 perished; in 2001, more than 7000 women died; and in 2009, it was reported that 8383 women died from dowry deaths. These figures report only confirmed dowry deaths; many more are believed to occur but are reported as suicides, kitchen accidents, or other fatal domestic incidents.

The power relationships that place women below men in India cannot simply be legislated away. Government entities in India (federal as well as State) have set up legal aid offices to help women who fear dowry death and seek assistance. In 1984, the national legislature passed the Family Courts Act, creating a network of “family courts” to hear domestic cases, including dowry disputes. But the judges tend to be older males, and their chief objective, according to women's support groups, is to hold the family together—that is, to force the threatened or battered woman back into the household. Hindu culture attaches great importance to the family structure, and the family courts tend to operate on this principle.

Recognizing that movement away from arranged marriages and dowries among the Indian population is slow in coming, the journalist and talk show host took the issue of dowry deaths to the global scale—to generate activism in the West and create change at the local scale in India. Ling explained that the place of women in India has changed little. She described women as a financial burden on the bride's family, who must save for a sizable dowry to marry off the woman. Ling describes the dowry as a financial transaction; through marriage the burden of the woman moves from the bride's family to her husband's family. Yet Winfrey and Ling interviewed a woman in India to show that global change can help make local change possible. Nisha Sharma was to marry in front of 1500 guests in a town just outside of the capital of New Delhi. On her wedding day, the groom’s family demanded $25,000 in addition to the numerous luxury items they had already received as dowry (including washing machines, a flat screen TV, and a car). Nisha's father refused to pay, the man's family became violent, and Nisha called the police. She has become a local hero and is also an example in the West of how to beat the dowry deaths using global technology, in this case, a cell phone.

In India and elsewhere, directing the attention of people in far-flung places to social ills—moving the issues up in scale—has the potential to create change. Yet problems cannot really be solved unless power relations shift at the family, local, regional, and national scales. As the number of women and men in the middle class in urban India continues to rise, love marriages will continue to rise, as well. The number of dowry deaths, arranged marriages, and divorces in the country will continue to fluctuate as power relations shift across gender and scales.

Shifting Power Relations among Ethnic Groups

In Chapter 4, we discussed local cultures that define themselves ethnically. The presence of local ethnic cultures can be seen in the cultural landscapes of places we discussed in Chapter 4: “Little Sweden” in Kansas or the Italian North End in Boston. In many places, more than one ethnic group lives in a place, creating unique cultural landscapes and revealing how power relations factor into the ways ethnicities are constructed, revised, and solidified, where ethnic groups live, and who is subjugating whom.

Three urban geographers, John Frazier, Florence Margai, and Eugene Tettley-Fio, tracked the flow of people and shifts in power relations among the multiple ethnic groups that have lived in Alameda County, California, in their book Race and Place: Equity Issues in Urban America.
The county borders San Francisco and includes the geographic areas of Berkeley and Oakland. Latinos populated the region prior to the Gold Rush. After 1850, migrants from China came to the county. The first Asian migrants to the county were widely dispersed, but the first African Americans lived in a segregated section of the county.

Areas with multiple ethnicities often experience an ebb and flow of acceptance over time. When the economy is booming, residents are generally more accepting of each other. When the economy takes a downturn, residents often begin to resent each other and can blame the “Other” for their economic hardship (for example, “they” took all the jobs). In Alameda County, much of the population resented Chinese migrants when the economy took a downturn in the 1870s. The United States government passed the first Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited immigration of Chinese in 1882. Chinese exclusion efforts persisted for decades afterward in Alameda County and resulted in the city of Oakland moving Chinatown several times.

During the 1910s, the economy of the region grew again, but the city of Oakland limited the Chinese residents to Chinatown, using ethnic segregation to keep them apart from the rest of the population. Frazier, Margai, and Tettey-Fio described how Oakland’s Chinatown was dictated by law and not elected by choice:

At a time when the Chinese were benefiting from a better economy, the “whites only” specifications of local zoning and neighborhood regulations forced separatism that segregated the Oakland Chinese into the city’s Chinatown. What today
is sometimes presented as an example of Chinese unity and choice was, in fact, place dictated by law.

Until World War II, the Chinese were segregated from the rest of Oakland’s population. When the war began, residents of Alameda County, like much of the rest of the United States, focused on the Japanese population in the county, persecuting, segregating, and blaming them. After World War II, the ethnic population of Asians in Alameda County became more complex. The Asian population alone doubled in the decade between 1980 and 1990 and diversified to include not only Chinese and Japanese but also Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians. In Alameda County today, as in much of the rest of the United States, the first wave of immigrants from Asia (mainly from China, India, and Korea), who came to the region already educated, are not residentially segregated from the white population. However, the newer immigrants from Asia (mainly Southeast Asia—during and following the Vietnam War) are segregated from whites residentially, mixing much more with the African American population in inner-city neighborhoods. Here, Asians experience a high rate of poverty, much like the Hispanic and African American populations in the same regions of the county do.

In California and in much of the rest of the United States, the “Asian” box is drawn around a stereotype of what some call the “model minority.” Frazier and his colleagues explain the myth of the model minority: the myth “paints Asians as good, hardworking people who, despite their suffering through discrimination, harassment, and exclusion, have found ways to prosper through peaceful means.” Other researchers have debunked the myth by
demonstrating statistically the different levels of economic success experienced by various Asian peoples, with most success going to the first wave of migrants and lower paying jobs going to newer migrants. Both groups are burdened with a myth that stereotypes them as the “model minority.”

Power Relations in Los Angeles

Over the last four decades, the greatest migration flow into California and the southwestern United States has come from Latin America and the Caribbean, especially Mexico. The 2010 Census reported a 43 percent increase in the Hispanic or Latino population of the country. The City of Los Angeles had over 3.79 million people, 48.48 percent of whom were Hispanic. The Hispanic population in the city grew from 39.32 percent of the population in 1990 to 48.48 percent by 2010.

The area of southeastern Los Angeles County is today “home to one of the largest and highest concentrations of Latinos in Southern California,” according to a study by geographer James Curtis. Four decades ago, this area of Los Angeles was populated by working-class whites who were segregated from the African American and Hispanic populations through discriminatory policies and practices. Until the 1960s, southeastern Los Angeles was home to corporations such as General Motors, Bethlehem Steel, and Weiser Lock. During the 1970s and 1980s, corporations began to close as the United States went through a period of deindustrialization (see Chapter 11). As plants closed and white laborers left the neighborhoods, a Hispanic population migrated into southeastern Los Angeles. A housing crunch followed in the 1980s, as more and more Hispanic migrants headed to southeastern Los Angeles. With a cheap labor supply now readily available in the region again, companies returned to southeastern Los Angeles, this time focusing on smaller-scale production of textiles, pharmaceuticals, furniture, and toys. In addition, the region attracted industrial toxic-waste disposal and petrochemical refining facilities.

In his study of the region, Curtis records the changes to the cultural landscape in the process. He uses the term barriözation (derived from the Spanish word for neighborhood, barrio) to describe a change that saw the Hispanic population of a neighborhood jump from 4 percent in 1960 to over 90 percent in 2000. With the ethnic succession of the neighborhood from white to Hispanic, the cultural landscape changed to reflect the culture of the new population. The structure of the streets and the layout of the housing remained largely the same, giving the Hispanic population access to designated parks, schools, libraries, and community centers built by the previous residents and rarely found in other barrios in Southern California. However, the buildings, signage, and landscape changed as “traditional Hispanic housescape elements, including the placement of fences and yard shrines as well as the use of bright house colors” diffused through the barrios. Curtis explains that these elements were added to existing structures, houses, and buildings originally built by the white working class of southeastern Los Angeles.

The influx of new ethnic groups into a region, the replacement of one ethnic group by another within neighborhoods, changes to the cultural landscape, the persistence of myths such as the “model minority” myth of Asians, and an economic downturn can create a great deal of volatility in a city.

On April 29–30, 1992, the City of Los Angeles, California, became engulfed in one of the worst incidents of civil unrest in United States history. During the two days of rioting 43 people died, 2,383 people were injured, and 16,291 people were arrested. Property damage was estimated at approximately $1 billion, and over 22,700 law enforcement personnel were deployed to quell the unrest. According to the media, the main catalyst for the mass upheaval was the announcement of a “not guilty” verdict in the trial of four white Los Angeles police officers accused of using excessive force in the videotaped arrest of Rodney King, a black motorist. To the general public, the Los Angeles riots became yet another symbol for the sorry state of race relations between blacks and whites in the United States. Yet, a geographic perspective on the Los Angeles riots helps us understand that they were not simply the product of localized reactions to police brutality, but reflected sweeping economic, political, and ethnic changes unfolding at regional and even global scales.

The riots took place in South Central Los Angeles. Like the region of southeast Los Angeles (described above), the South Central area was once a thriving industrial region.
Geographer James Johnson and his colleagues explored the impact of economic loss on the ethnic and social geography of South Central Los Angeles. They found that the population of the area was over 90 percent African American in 1970, and by 1990, the population was evenly split between African Americans and Hispanics. This change in population composition was accompanied by a steady influx of Korean residents and small-business owners who were trying to find a niche in the rapidly changing urban area (Fig. 5.19).
Geographers who study race, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality are interested in the power relations embedded in a place from which assumptions about “others” are formed or reinforced. Consider your own place, your campus, or your locality. What power relations are embedded in this place?

Summary

Identity is a powerful concept. The way we make sense of ourselves is a personal journey that is mediated and influenced by the political, social, and cultural contexts in which we live and work. Group identities such as gender, ethnicity, race, and sexuality are constructed, both by self-realization and by identifying against and across scales. When learning about new places and different people, humans are often tempted to put places and people into boxes, into myths or stereotypes that make them easily digestible.

The geographer, especially one who spends time in the field, recognizes that how people shape and create places varies across time and space and that time, space, and place shape people, both individually and in groups. James Curtis ably described the work of a geographer who studies places: “But like the popular images and stereotypical portrayals of all places—whether positive or negative, historical or contemporary—these mask a reality on the ground that is decidedly more complex and dynamic, from both the economic and social perspectives.” What Curtis says about places is true about people as well. What we may think to be positive identities, such as the myths of “Orientalism” or of the “model minority,” and what we know are negative social ills, such as racism and dowry deaths, are all decidedly more complex and dynamic than they first seem.

Geographic Concepts

gender
identity
identifying against
race
racism
residential segregation
succession
sense of place
ethnicity
space
place
gendered
queer theory
donry deaths
barrioization

Learn More Online

About the Gay and Lesbian Atlas
www.urban.org/pubs/gayatlas/

http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/resseg/papertoc.html

About the Murals in Northern Ireland
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/mccormick/intro.htm
Watch It Online

About Ethnicity and the City
http://www.learner.org/resources/series180.html#program_descriptions
click on Video On Demand for “Boston: Ethnic Mosaic”

About Ethnic Fragmentation in Canada
www.learner.org/resources/series180.html#program_descriptions
click on Video On Demand for “Vancouver: Hong Kong East” and “Montreal: An Island of French”

About Migration and Identity
http://www.learner.org/resources/series85.html#program_descriptions
click on Video on Demand for “A Migrant’s Heart”